Unfortunately, what people think should happen and what the law requires are not always the same. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently made headlines when it ruled that an Indiana statute that bans most registered sex offenders from using social networking websites, like Facebook, was unconstitutional.

The controversial law specifically prohibits certain sex offenders from “knowingly or intentionally us[ing]: a social networking web site” or “an instant messaging or chat room program” that “the offender knows allows a person who is less than eighteen (18) years of age to access or use the web site or program.” The American Civil Liberties Union of Indiana challenged the statute on behalf of a class of unidentified sex offenders.

Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit overturned the law on First Amendment grounds, after concluding that the Indiana law was not narrowly tailored to serve the state’s interest. “It broadly prohibits substantial protected speech rather than specifically targeting the evil of improper communications to minors,” the opinion in John Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion County, Indiana states.

The appeals court also noted that “the Supreme Court has invalidated bans on expressive activity that are not the substantive evil if the state had alternative means of combating the evil.” In this case, the court found that there were other ways for the state to curb inappropriate communication between minors and sex offenders. It specifically noted that Indiana has other existing laws that punish “inappropriate communication with a child” and communication “with the intent to gratify the sexual desires of the person or the individual,”

The court further highlighted that laws infringing on First Amendment rights must be narrowly tailored. “Subsequent Indiana statutes may well meet this requirement, but the blanket ban on social media in this case regrettably does not.”

According to Indiana Attorney General Greg Zoeller, the state is reviewing the opinion and considering its legal options, including appeal. From a legislative perspective, Sen. John Waterman, who authored the overturned law, has pledged to come up with a new way to protect children from sex offenders online that will pass constitutional scrutiny.

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- From LexisNexis® Mealey’s™ Daily Legal News.

A Washington federal judge on April 17 denied certification of a class of Comcast Cable Communications Management LLC employees who claim that they are owed pay for work performed prior to the start of their shifts, finding that too many individual issues exist (Karen Ginsburg, et al. v. Comcast Cable Communications Management LLC, No. 11-1959, W.D. Wash.; 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55149).

Karen Ginsburg and Jessica Walker worked as customer account executives (CAEs) at call centers operated by Comcast.

The CAEs spend most of their time on the telephone with Comcast customers, assisting them with inquiries. Ginsburg and Walker, like all CAEs, were hourly paid employees. However, they claimed that all CAEs often arrived at work prior to the scheduled start of their shifts in order to perform tasks preliminary to answering customer phone calls. They claimed that they received no pay for this work in violation of the Washington Minimum Wage Act and other Washington wage-and-hour laws.

Ginsburg and Walker filed a class complaint against Comcast in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. They sought to represent more than 2,000 CAEs who have worked at Comcast’s Washington call centers since October 2007.

Certification Denied

Judge Richard A. Jones denied the motion for class certification. “What the court does conclude, based on the anecdotal evidence, is that many of the questions critical to the resolution of class members’ claims are not susceptible of classwide proof. For example, Plaintiffs contend for the first time in their reply brief that the ‘common issue that predominates in this litigation was whether the “first principal activity” of the CAE workday is the required act of logging into their computers.’ . . . Plaintiffs assert that the answer to this question ‘will be the same for all class members,’ but the anecdotal evidence leads the court to conclude otherwise. The anecdotal evidence reveals that some individuals start work by logging into their phones or with some other act. It also reveals that some individuals log into their computers but do not start work. Plaintiffs suggest no classwide proof that would establish what act marks the beginning of compensable work, and the evidence suggests that the answer varies for every class member,” the judge wrote, adding that “[o]ther individualized questions abound.”

Andrew C. Ficzko, James B. Zouras and Ryan F. Stephen of Stephan Zouras in Chicago and Beth E. Terrell, Erika L. Nusser and Jennifer R. Murray of Terrell, Marshall, Daudt & Willie in Seattle represent the plaintiffs.

Jeffrey A. Hollingsworth and Chelsea D. Peterson of Perkins Coie in Seattle represent Comcast.

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- From LexisNexis® Mealey’s™ Daily Legal News.

A federal judge in California on April 15 preliminary approved a $ 9.5 million settlement of a class action brought by law students against West Publishing Co. and Kaplan Inc. for conspiring to restrain trade in the market for bar review preparation courses, following his rejection of an earlier settlement (Stephen Stetson, et al. v. West Publishing Corporation, No. CV-08-00810, C.D. Calif.).

Stephen Stetson filed a class action complaint alleging that BAR/BRI, a division of West, paid Kaplan Inc. up to $ 750,000 per year to refrain from entering the full-service bar review market. Stetson alleged that West and Kaplan violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring to restrain trade in that market and that West violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by unlawfully acquiring and/or maintaining a monopoly.

The claims were brought on behalf of individuals who purchased bar-review courses after July 31, 2006.

Previous Settlements

The purchasers reached a nonmonetary settlement with Kaplan, whereby Kaplan agreed to provide class members with discount certificates redeemable toward the purchase of future Kaplan educational courses, excluding bar review courses. The purchasers also reached a monetary settlement with West.

In July 2011, U.S. Judge Manuel L. Real of the Central District of California denied final approval to the settlement worth $ 5.28 million, holding that the average recovery amount of $ 92 per class member did not reasonably compare to other antitrust settlements against West.

In addition, the judge concluded that the coupons represented only “nominal value” to class members and the noncash settlement would “encourage . . . further business with Kaplan rather than disgorge[e] ill-gotten gains.”

In November 2011, the Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeal ruled that the Stetson plaintiffs were not bound by the 2007 settlement in Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp. (No. 05-3222, C.D. Calif.) because Rodriguez was brought on behalf of an earlier class of purchasers.

All Cash Settlement

The parties then reached the instant cash settlement of $ 9.5 million. The settlement does not include any discount certificates.

The purchasers estimate that the per-claimant gross recovery is $ 166, as opposed to the $ 92 gross cash recovery under the earlier proposed settlement.

The purchasers are represented by Alan Harris and David Zelenski of Harris & Ruble in Los Angeles.

Judge Real set the hearing for final approval of the class settlement for Aug. 19, 2013.

The purchasers are represented by David Zelenski and Alan Harris of Harris & Ruble in Los Angeles.

West is represented by Heather Gilhooly and Edward A. Klein of Liner Grode Stein Yankelevitz Sunshine Regenstreif & Taylor in Los Angeles; James F. Rittinger and Justin E. Klein of Satterlee, Stephens, Burke & Burke in New York; and James Patrick Tallon and Wayne D. Collins of Shearman & Sterling in New York. Kaplan is represented by Bradley J. Phillips, Stuart Neil Senator and Elisabeth Jill Neubauer of Munger, Tolles & Olson in Los Angeles.

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- From LexisNexis® Mealey’s™ Daily Legal News.

The federal bankruptcy judge presiding over the Chapter 9 proceeding of Jefferson County, Ala., on April 15 ruled that an insurer who alleges that it was fraudulently induced to provide $ 378 million in insurance coverage could not pursue its lawsuit because of the automatic stay (In Re: Jefferson County, Ala., No. 11-05736, Chapter 9, N.D. Ala. Bkcy.).

In 2011, Jefferson County filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

Sewer System

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama entered a consent decree in 1996 that required Jefferson County to remediate its sewer system.

The county proceeded to raise billions of dollars for the development of its sewer system by issuing warrants secured exclusively by revenue generated by its sewer system, which were underwritten by JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. and its affiliate J.P. Morgan Securities LLC.

The county also entered into several interest rate swap transactions with JPMorgan in relation to these warrants.

Between 2002 and 2005, the county and JPMorgan made several agreements with Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp., f/k/a Financial Security Assurance Inc. and Syncora Guarantee Inc. under which Assured and Syncora issued policies that insured against the county’s failure to pay principal and interest on the warrants. Assured also reinsured more than $ 360 million in policies originally issued by Syncora and Assured.

Fraud Alleged

In 2010, Assured sued JPMorgan in the New York County Supreme Court, alleging fraud and aiding and abetting fraud in connection with the financing of the sewer system. Specifically, Assured contended that JPMorgan made false statements and paid bribes to county officials, getting Assured to provide $ 378 million in insurance coverage for the county’s municipal debt. Syncora filed a separate lawsuit in the same court alleging the same causes of action.

Bankruptcy Judge Thomas B. Bennet held that the actions filed by Assured and Syncora are subject to the automatic stay under 11 U.S. Code Section 362(a)(1). The bankruptcy judge determined that allowing the Assured action to proceed would circumvent the purpose of the automatic stay.

Moreover, the bankruptcy judge said, Assured’s fraud allegations may affect the claims allowance, subordination and adjustment of debt processes in this court. Furthermore, the Assured action “also represents an attempt to fix the amount of Assured’s claim against the county via outside litigation even though the Bankruptcy Court is the more efficient forum for making such a determination,” Bankruptcy Judge Bennett said.

Burden

The bankruptcy judge ruled further that allowing the Assured action to proceed would impose a burden on the county that would substantially hinder its adjustment of debts by diverting its attention and resources away from the bankruptcy process.

“The stakes in the Assured Action are high, and discovery is in the early stages,” Bankruptcy Judge Bennett said. “Assured alleges that fraud occurred during the financing of the sewer system, which is responsible for approximately $ 3.14 billion of the County’s $ 4.23 billion in scheduled debt, and makes allegations that involve hundreds of millions of dollars in potential compensatory and punitive damages.”

Bankruptcy Judge Bennett also ruled that the prejudice to the county far outweighs any hardship to Assured; therefore, he said he would not modify the automatic stay for the Assured action to proceed.

Jefferson County is represented by James Blake Bailey of Bradley Arant Boult Cummings in Birmingham. JP Morgan is represented by Ian Dattner of Simpson Thacher & Bartlett in New York. Syncora is represented by Daniel Holzman of New York. Assured is represented by Samuel S. Kohn of Winston & Strawn in New York.

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- From LexisNexis® Mealey’s™ Daily Legal News.

Trinity Place Holdings Inc., an entity formed out of bankrupt Syms Corp., on April 11 filed a brief in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, arguing that Syms should not be required to pay rent on various buildings based on the wording of the leases (In Re: Filene’s Basement LLC, No. 11-13511, Chapter 11, D. Del. Bkcy.).

Filene’s Basement LLC filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2011. As an affiliate of Filene’s, Syms entered bankruptcy at the same time.

Reconsideration Sought

On March 5, Trinity Place Holdings Inc., f/k/a Syms, moved for reconsideration of a Bankruptcy Court’s ruling that Syms was responsible for rent on a property in connection with a loan tied to a mortgage-refinancing deal.

Trinity maintains that the type of mortgage involved does not obligate Syms to pay rent.

On Feb. 9, the Bankruptcy Court ruled that Syms was obligated to pay a percentage of rent on a property in Rockville, Md., in connection with a mortgage-refinancing deal that Syms argues is more appropriately characterized as a bridge loan.

The $ 10 million loan and mortgage were part of a corporate finance or asset-based loan transaction, which, Syms maintains, is “precisely how Bank of America viewed it.”

Syms contends that the Bankruptcy Court erred in its ruling because it did not consider whether the mortgage was a refinancing as required by the plain language of the lease. In fact, Syms argues that the mortgage was not a refinancing.

Refinancing

Trinity argues in its current brief that the term “refinancing” as described by Syms and as commonly understood, is consisting with the letter and spirit of the ground lease.

Furthermore, Trinity argues that Syms’ interpretation of “permanent mortgage refinancing” is the only one that both accounts for all of the actual words used by the drafters of the ground lease and is consistent with the trade usage of those words in the commercial real estate and commercial real estate finance industries.

Trinity argues that Syms is entitled to reconsideration because the Bankruptcy Court’s decision was erroneous.

Filene’s is represented by Mark S. Chehi, Jay Goffman, Nancy Lieberman, Morris Kramer and Mark McDermott of Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom in Wilmington. Syms is represented by Michael R. Lastowski of Duane Morris in New York. Trinity is represented by Sean M. Beach, John T. Dorsey, Curtis J. Crowther, Patrick A. Jackson and Ashley E. Markow of Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor in Wilmington.

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- From LexisNexis® Mealey’s™ Daily Legal News.

Bankrupt adult entertainment company GGW Brands LLC, the parent company of the producer of videos called “Girls Gone Wild,” on April 10 filed a brief in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California contending that the attorney it seeks to permission to appoint does not pose a conflict of interest for the company (In Re: GGW Brands LLC, No. 13-15130, Chapter 11, C.D. Calif. Bkcy.).

GGW Brands Inc., along with GGW Direct, GGW Events and GGW Magazine, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on Feb. 27.

Conflict Alleged, Rebutted 

GGW contends that “the mere existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship does not amount to an actual conflict of interest,” as has been alleged by the U.S. trustee.

Furthermore, GGW maintains that in cases where a conflict of interest may exist, courts have favored a “wait and see” approach.

On March 21, the U.S. trustee filed a brief opposing GGW’s motion to appoint Robert M. Yaspan of the Law Offices of Robert M. Yaspan as bankruptcy counsel.

11 U.S. Code Section 101

The U.S. trustee argues that Yaspan was not a disinterested party as required by 11 U.S. Code Section 101(13). Rather, the U.S. trustee said, Yaspan was held on retainer by all the GGW entities involved in the bankruptcy.

Specifically, at the time GGW filed its petition, $ 17,000 of the retainers for both GGW Brands and GGW Direct remained untapped. Furthermore, $ 2,000 remained of the retainers for GGW Magazine and GGW Events, the U.S. trustee says.

Moreover, the U.S. trustee says he believed that based upon information provided at the initial debtor interview, the related debtors share office facilities as well as employees.

GGW is represented by Yaspan of the Law Offices of Robert M. Yaspan in Woodland Hills, Calif. The U.S. trustee, Peter C. Anderson, is represented by Dare Law of the Office of the U.S. Trustee in Los Angeles.

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Romantic relationships in the workplace can often wreak havoc. However, one law firm’s fraternization program is now the basis for an employment lawsuit.

Kimberly A. Elkjer is suing her Texas law firm over its policy of prohibiting male and female employees from being “alone together,” both in and out of the office. Elkjer further claims that although the policy has since been rescinded, the segregated office environment that it created makes it more difficult for female lawyers to advance in the firm.

“Scheef & Stone LLP has fostered a culture that generally encourages sex-based stereotypes, impedes female attorneys’ ability to develop professional relationships with male attorneys at the firm, promotes greater income and business opportunities for male attorneys at the firm as compared to female attorneys at the firm, and undermines female attorneys’ perceived and actual ability to perform work,” the suit maintains.

Elkjer, a partner at the firm, contends that she raised her concerns to the firm’s managers, but faced push back. “Indeed, the firm has met opposition to unlawful employment practices with expressed hostility and/or unwarranted threats,” the complaint states. She is now seeking an injunction as well as compensatory and punitive damages for gender discrimination.

Meanwhile, Scheef & Stone L.L.P. argues there is “no evidence” to support Elkjer’s claims, stating that other female attorneys do not agree with her characterization of the work environment. “In fact, objective evidence and our business records will clearly show that Ms. Elkjer disagrees with legitimate business decisions based on objective non-discriminatory criteria by the firm’s management that have nothing to do with gender and apply to all attorneys in the firm,” the firm maintained in a press statement.

As this case highlights, fraternization policies can be a double-edged sword. While they can help protect a company from sexual harassment claims, they also have the potential to create a segregated work environment in which female employees may not have access to the same opportunities.

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- From LexisNexis® Mealey’s™ Daily Legal News.

The federal bankruptcy judge presiding over the Chapter 11 bankruptcy of Hostess Brands Inc. on April 9 approved the sale of the company’s bread assets to Mountain States Bakeries LLC, which paid a deposit of $ 1.5 million in anticipation of the full purchase price of $ 28.85 million pursuant to the asset sale agreement (In Re: Hostess Brands Inc., No. 12-22052, Chapter 11, S.D. N.Y. Bkcy.).

(Order available 80-130417-018R )

Bread Assets

Hostess filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on Jan. 11, 2012, in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. A year later to the day, Hostess moved for approval of a proposal to sell the majority of its bread business to Flowers Foods Inc. for $ 360 million.

However, the Northwest Bakeries assets remained unpurchased.

Mountain States, a wholly owned subsidiary of United States Bakery, outbid 13 other potential buyers and agreed to purchase the Northwest Bakeries business assets, which comprise products branded as Sweetheart, Grandma Emilie’s and Eddy’s.

Free And Clear

Bankruptcy Judge Robert D. Drain ruled that Hostess could sell the Northwest Bakeries business assets “free and clear of all liens, claims, rights, liabilities, encumbrances and other interests of any kind or nature whatsoever, including, without limitation, any debts arising under or out of, in connection with, or in any way relating to, any acts or omissions, obligations, demands, guaranties, rights, contractual commitments, restrictions, product liability claims, environmental liabilities, employee pension or benefit plan claims, multiemployer benefit plan claims, retiree health care or life insurance claims of Hostess, and any transferee or successor liability claims, rights or causes of action, whether arising prior to or subsequent to the commencement of these cases, whether known or unknown.”

The U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York had objected to Hostess’ sale of its bread assets, contending that it would improperly release the purchaser of those assets from potential environmental liability related to properties that would be sold as part of the transaction.

Objection

Specifically, U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara contended that the Bankruptcy Court should deny Hostess’ motion to sell its assets because it would diminish or eliminate the U.S. government’s ability to enforce its general police and regulatory powers as they relate to environmental laws.

The bankruptcy judge said that if the sale could not be made free and clear of all encumbrances, there would have been no asset sale; therefore, he ruled that Mountain States – or another purchaser, should the deal with Mountain States fall through – would not be liable for any claims against the Northwest Bakeries business assets.

Hostess is represented by Corinne Ball of Jones Day in New York, Frederick W.H. Carter of Venable in Baltimore, Ira L. Herman of Thompson & Knight in New York and Paul M. Hoffman of Stinson Morrison & Hecker in Kansas City, Mo.

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- From LexisNexis® Mealey’s™ Daily Legal News.

Bankrupt financial group Residential Capital LLC (ResCap) on April 9 filed a brief in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York defending its plan to pay $ 7.8 million in bonuses to key employees on grounds that it complies with the Bankruptcy Code (In Re: Residential Capital LLC, No. 12-12020, Chapter 11, S.D. N.Y. Bkcy.).

ResCap filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on May 14.

Bonuses

The U.S. trustee in the case on April 3 objected to ResCap’s plan to pay $ 7.8 million in bonuses to various employees because ResCap’s plan fails to provide crucial information about the details of how bonuses will be paid.

The bonuses comprise three separate incentive plans.

ResCap argues that the incentive plan in question contains challenging metrics and is proper pursuant to 11 U.S. Code Section 503(c)(3).

Business Judgment

Furthermore, ResCap contends that it is a “reasonable and sound exercise” of its business judgment, to offer the bonuses at issue. The company maintains that it has constructed compensation plans that align the creditors’ interests with ResCap’s employees by tying the executives’ awards to both their ability to be fiscally responsible and manage the estate’s core operational expenses.

ResCap insists that the incentive plans promote the creation of hundreds of millions of dollars of value for the estate; thus, as the estate benefits, so do the participants in the incentive plans.

Contrary to the assertions of the U.S. trustee, 11 U.S. Code Section 503(c)(1) does not apply to the incentive plans because the payments under those plans are not being made “for the purpose of inducing such person to remain with the debtor’s business,” ResCap says.

Metrics

The U.S. trustee contends that ResCap failed to prove that the incentive metrics designed for bonus recipients are not “virtually guaranteed” and mere “lay-ups” and that the present targets are difficult to achieve, forcing the insiders to “stretch” to earn their bonuses.

The trustee, Tracy Hope Davis, is represented by Brian S. Masumoto and Michael Driscoll of the U.S. Attorney’s Office in New York. ResCap is represented by Gary S. Lee, Lorenzo Marinuzzi and Jordan A. Wishnew of Morrison & Foerster in New York.

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- From LexisNexis® Mealey’s™ Daily Legal News.

A federal judge in Florida on April 5 dismissed aiding and abetting claims the receiver of imprisoned Ponzi schemer Arthur Nadel brought against Wells Fargo Bank NA and Wachovia Bank NA, finding that the receiver has not shown enough proof that Wachovia knew about Nadel”s fraudulent transactions (Burton W. Wiand, et al. v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., et al., No. 12-0557, M.D. Fla.).

U.S. Judge James D. Whittemore of the Middle District of Florida made the ruling in the suit the receiver, Burton W. Wiand, filed against the bank and Timothy Ryan Best, a former Wachovia vice president.

Nadel pleaded guilty in February 2010 to securities crimes in association with running a group of hedge funds, established under his Scoop Capital LLC and Scoop Management Inc.

companies, as a Ponzi scheme. He was sentenced to 14 years in prison and ordered to repay $ 162 million.

Receiver”s Allegations

In the instant suit, Wiand alleged that Wells Fargo and Wachovia offered certain financial services to Nadel that should have alerted the banks to Nadel”s fraudulent activity. The services included funding mortgages to Nadel despite his allegedly poor credit, an alleged commingling of Wachovia funds across his accounts, the transfer of funds between nonprofit and business accounts and large transfers between personal and business accounts.

In his second amended complaint, filed Dec. 28, 2012, Wiand contended that Wachovia had actual knowledge of Nadel”s fraud. Wiand alleged that Wachovia looked at Nadel”s financial history before funding mortgages for him and that his transactions registered in Wachovia”s fraud-alert system. According to Wiand, Wachovia also engaged in certain transactions involving Nadel”s hedge funds.

The defendants moved to dismiss on Jan. 11. They argued that Wiand”s four counts for aiding and abetting should be dismissed because Wiand failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

No ‘Strong Inference’

“Plaintiffs alleging aiding-and-abetting liability for a bank”s participation in a Ponzi scheme sometimes rely on ‘red flags” or procedural infirmities that should have alerted the bank to potentially unscrupulous activity by its customer,” Judge Whittemore said. “These ‘red flags,” however, are insufficient to establish a claim for aiding and abetting because ‘although they may have put the banks on notice that some impropriety may have been taking place, those alleged facts do not create a strong inference of actual knowledge” of wrongdoing. Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 459 F.3d 273, 294 (2d Cir. 2006). As a corollary to that proposition, banks that conduct routine banking services, even for transactions or activities that appear atypical upon review, are not required to investigate the account holder”s transactions. [Lawrence v. Bank of Am. N.A. (455 Fed. Appx. 907 [11th Cir. 2012])] (citing Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass”n of Hollywood v. Emile, 216 So. 2d 443, 446 (Fla. 1968); 0″Halloran v. First United Nat”l Bank of Fla., 350 F.3d 1197, 1205 (11th Cir. 2003)).

The judge added that Lawrence “is not binding authority” but said “its factual similarity makes it persuasive when analyzing whether Receiver”s allegations of actual knowledge are plausible.”

“The only factual allegation approaching actual knowledge is Wachovia”s ‘participation” in certain hedge funds, but even that allegation falls flat,” Judge Whittemore said. “In Paragraphs 63 and 64 [of the second amended complaint], the Receiver alleges that Wachovia ‘participated” in ‘derivative transactions” which were ‘related to” Scoop Real Estate and Viking Fund through an ‘affiliate” of the bank. These paragraphs provide no details concerning the affiliate, the transactions, the information received, or how the transactions were related to the hedge funds. The paragraphs fail to plausibly allege that Wachovia had actual knowledge of Nadel”s wrongdoing through participation in the investments.”

The judge also rejected Wiand”s alternative argument that actual knowledge may be alleged through facts demonstrating “reckless conduct,” explaining that Wiand”s claims “are rooted in Florida tort law, not federal securities law” and that “the requirement of actual knowledge has long been a part of Florida law.”

Fraudulent Transfer

Judge Whittemore went on to dismiss Wiand”s claim for negligence, explaining that the second amended complaint does not provide a plausible, factual basis to conclude that Wachovia “[knew] that an actual misappropriation is intended or is in progress.” He also dismissed Wiand”s fraudulent transfer claim as to Best “because there is cause of action for aiding and abetting a fraudulent transfer when the alleged aider-and-abettor is not a transferee.”

However, the judge found that Wiand states a claim against Wachovia for fraudulent transfer, finding that “his allegations of red flags and fraud alerts . . . plausibly raise the question of whether Wachovia ‘had actual knowledge of such facts or circumstances as would have induced an ordinarily prudent person to make inquiry,”" quoting Wiand v. Waxenberg (611 F. Supp. 2d, 1319 [M.D. Fla. 2009]).

Lastly, Judge Whittemore ruled that Wiand has sufficiently stated a claim for unjust enrichment. The judge found unpersuasive the defendants” arguments that the claim fails because fees charged in connection with the deposit accounts cannot be recovered through an unjust enrichment claim and because Wiand has a legal remedy.

Wiand is represented by Jonathan Betten Cohen, Sean P. Keefe and Terry Alan Smiljanich of James, Hoyer, Newcomer & Smiljanich in Tampa. The defendants are represented by Beth A. Cronin, Dale W. Cravey and Marie Tomassi in St. Petersburg, Fla., and Charles M. Harris Jr. and Marvin E. Barkin in Tampa, all of Trenam Kemker.

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