Through modern reproductive technology, a woman can carry a baby for nine months, but not be the child’s mother. Similarly, a man can provide the genetic material to create a child with no intention of becoming a father. However, while science has dramatically changed how people become parents, laws regarding parental rights have failed to keep up with these advances.

In Kansas, a sperm donor is being asked to pay child support, even though he signed an agreement disclaiming any financial responsibility for the child. William Marotta provided sperm to a lesbian couple seeking to have a child, and the insemination procedure was performed without using a medical facility. Given the high costs of artificial insemination, these private agreements are increasingly common.

However, the state of Kansas does not consider him a donor, but a father. The state only only recognizes agreements between sperm donors and parents when a medical professional performs the procedure. As a result, Marotta is now involved in a complicated case that has received national attention.

In another high profile assisted reproduction case, a Florida judge recently approved a birth certificate listing three people. They include a married lesbian couple and the gay man that donated sperm.

The non-traditional birth certificate was part of a settlement between the parties. The biological father and the couple had an oral agreement under which he was to provide his sperm for artificial insemination. However, after the child was born, he sought a larger role in the child’s life. Although Florida law traditionally does not award custody rights to sperm donors, the child’s mothers will have sole custody, and the sperm donor will have visitation, under the terms of the settlement.

These cases reveal a complex area of law that must continue to evolve to keep pace reproductive science as well as social trends. Many states, including Kansas, based their initial laws on the Uniform Parentage Act, which was first adopted in 1973. Although the model law was updated in 1994, only nine states have implemented the changes, which include removing the doctor involvement requirement for a sperm donor seeking to disclaim parental responsibility. As a result, courts must use old laws to determine the parental rights to children born using new technology.

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- From LexisNexis® Mealey’s™ Daily Legal News.

A Kentucky federal judge on May 13 granted final approval of a $ 45 million settlement to be paid by Skechers U.S.A. Inc. to end multidistrict litigation alleging that the company’s “toning” footwear was falsely advertised to improve posture, promote weight loss, strengthen the back, improve blood circulation, promote sleep, reduce stress and burn calories (In Re: Skechers Toning Shoe Products Liability Litigation, No. 11-2308, W.D. Ky.; 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67441).

In granting final approval, Senior Judge Thomas B. Russell of the Western District of Kentucky found objections to the settlement to be without merit. “For the first category, reimbursement of the full price of the shoes would preclude payment to some class members because the settlement fund would be consumed more quickly. Furthermore, reimbursement of the full price would overcompensate the class members. As represented by Grabowski and Skechers, the monetary relief available under the settlement is calculated to compensate the class members for the difference between the shoe they bought and the shoe actually received. Reimbursement of the full purchase price would overcompensate class members. The second category cannot truly be considered objections because the objectors express satisfaction with the product received and do not seeks compensation or other relief. The final category is also without merit because the proposed settlement in no way waives, infringes on, or otherwise affects a class member’s right to maintain personal injury claims against Skechers.

The proposed settlement only reaches the consumer fraud and economic injury claims,” the judge held.

Under the terms of the settlement, Skechers has established a $ 40 million fund for the payment of class claims. Payments to class members, per pair of shoes purchased, will range between $ 20 and $ 84. Skechers also agreed to establish a separate $ 5 million fund for attorney fees and costs.

Deceptive Advertising

Tamara Grabowski filed a class action complaint against Skechers in June 2010 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. Grabowski alleged that Skechers falsely and deceptively advertised its toning shoes. She brought causes of action for violation of California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), California’s unfair competition law and breach of express warranty. Two months later, Venus Morga filed a class complaint in the same court, bringing nearly identical allegations against Skechers. She sought to represent the identical nationwide class as was alleged by Grabowski.

Concurrent with her complaint, Morga filed a notice of related case information. On Sept. 3, 2010, the Morga case was deemed related to Grabowski’s case and was transferred. On Feb. 18, 2011, amended class action complaints were filed in both cases. The amended complaints, which were substantively identical to each other, realleged Skechers’ violations of California’s consumer protection laws and asserted claims for breach of warranty. The amended complaints also sought damages as permitted by the CLRA.

Grabowski’s and Morga’s complaints were consolidated with others by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation and transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. Skechers denied all claims contained in both actions but decided to settle the suits.

Counsel

Paul J. Schachter, Penny U. Hendy and Ronald E. Johnson Jr. of Schachter, Hendy & Johnson in Fort Wright, Ky.; Robert K. Jenner and Jessica H. Meeder of Janet, Jenner & Suggs in Baltimore; Anthony B. Brewer and Morgan E. Welch of Welch, Brewer & Hudson in North Little Rock, Ark.; Jay R. Vaughn of Busald, Funk & Zeverly in Florence, Ky.; Richard W. Schulte of Wright & Schulte in Dayton, Ohio; Adam M. Priest of Pryor, Flynn, Priest & Harber in Knoxville, Tenn.; Jarrett L. Ellzey Jr. and William C. Hughes of Hughes Ellzey in Houston; Matthew H. Raty of the Law Office of Matthew H. Raty in Sandy, Utah; Charles T. Thronson and Richard E. Mrazik of Parsons, Behle & Latimer in Salt Lake City; Erik R. Blaine of Behnke, Martin & Schulte in Vandalia, Ohio; Damon B. Willis of Ewing, McMillin & Willis in Louisville; Joel M. Rubenstein of German Rubenstein in New York; Edward B. Mulligan V, Gregory L. Laker, Irvin B. Levin, Jeff S. Gibson and Melissa L. Stuart of Cohen & Malad in Indianapolis; Jason E. Holland and Kenneth R. Haggard of Hopkinsville, Ky.; David M. Kopstein of Kopstein & Associates in Seabrook, Md.; John L. Lowery of the Law Office of John L. Lowery in Nashville, Tenn.; Elaine A. Ryan, Patricia N. Syverson and Todd D. Carpenter of Bonnett, Fairbourn, Friedman & Balint in Phoenix; James C. Shah of Shepherd, Finkelman, Miller & Shah in Media, Pa.; Leslie E. Hurst, Thomas J. O’Reardon II and Timothy G. Blood of Blood, Hurst & O’Reardon in San Diego; and Pamela Gilbert of Cuneo, Gilbert & Laduca in Washington, D.C., represent the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs are also represented by: Janine L. Pollack of Wolf, Haldenstein, Alder, Freeman & Herz in New York; Jeff S. Westerman of Milberg in Los Angeles; Joshua Keller and Roland W. Riggs IV of Milberg in New York; Mark Salvato of Houston; John L. Lowery of the Law Office of John L. Lowery in Nashville; Barbara M. McDonald, Norberto J. Cisneros, Robert C. Maddox and Troy L. Isaacson of Maddox, Isaacson & Cisneros in Las Vegas; Christopher J. Morosoff of the Law Offices of Christopher J. Morosoff in Palm Desert, Calif.; Greg K. Hafif, Herbert Hafif and Michael G. Dawson of the Law Offices of Herbert Hafif in Claremont, Calif.; Ray A. Mandlekar of Ray A. Mandlekar Law Offices in Temecula, Calif.; Marc L. Godino of Glancy, Binkow & Goldberg in Los Angeles; Brett H. Cebulash and Kevin S. Landau of Taus, Cebulash & Landau in New York; Eric Cramer and Shanon J. Carson of Berger & Montague in Philadelphia; Melanie S. Bailey of Burg, Simpson, Eldredge, Hersh & Jardine in Cincinnati; Robert K. Jenner of Janet, Jenner & Suggs in Baltimore; Martin D. Crump and Trevor B. Rockstad of Davis & Crump in Gulfport, Miss.; Bradley Winston of Winston & Wigand in Davie, Fla.; David G. Bryant and Jasper D. Ward of Jones Ward in Louisville; Susan E. Burgess and Thomas G. Buchanan III of the Law Office of Thomas G. Buchanan in Little Rock; Daniel C. Brown of Kalamazoo, Mich.; and B. David Jarashow of the Law Offices of B. David Jarashow in Freehold, N.J.

Dennis M. O’Hara and Patrick K. Dahl of Wicker, Smith, Tutan, O’Hara, McCoy, Graham & Ford in Fort Lauderdale, Fla.; Carlos M. Lazatin, Daniel M. Petrocelli, Gloria M. Borges and Jeffrey A. Barker of O’Melveny & Myers in Los Angeles; Darrell S. Cockcroft of Thompson Coe in Austin, Texas; David D. Hudgins of Hubbard & Biederman in Dallas, J. Tanner Watkins, Jill F. Endicott and Patrick S. O’Bryan of Dinsmore & Shohl in Louisville; Jeffrey R. Schmieler and Lisa N. Walters of the Law Offices of Saunders & Schmieler in Silver Spring, Md.; Joanna K. Chan of O’Melveny & Myers in New York; Katrina R. Atkins of Dinsmore & Shohl in Cincinnati; Kristine A. Crosswhite of Crosswhite, Limbrick & Sinclair in Baltimore; Michael D. Barnes of Wright, Lindsey & Jennings in Little Rock; Richard L. Walter of Boehl, Stopher & Graves in Paducah, Ky.; Shea B. Oliver and Ted C. Raynor of Burch, Porter & Johnson in Memphis, Tenn., represent Skechers.

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- From LexisNexis® Mealey’s™ Daily Legal News.

A federal judge on May 13 filed an order granting an agreed motion by Facebook Inc. and the operators of a history-themed website, ending an almost 18-month dispute over alleged infringement of the “timelines” trademark by the social networking giant (Timelines Inc. v. Facebook Inc., No. 1:11-cv-06867, N.D. Ill.).

Infringement Complaint 

In September 2011, Chicago-based Timelines Inc. filed a lawsuit against Facebook, asserting trademark infringement and false designation under the Lanham Act, as well as violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act and the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act.

The tagline on Timelines’ website at timelines.com states that its users can “[d]iscover, record, and share history.” The site’s users can contribute to and comment on existing pages on historical events, such as the U.S. Civil War, great sports moments or assassinations. Users can also post content about their own events, to which other users can add additional content and comments. Timelines Inc. has federal trademark registrations for “Timelines,” “Timelines.com” and a design logo, as well as another trademark registration that was pending before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).

TRO Denied

Shortly before filing its complaint, Timelines learned that Facebook was then planning to launch the “timeline” feature on its popular social network. This feature allows Facebook users “to graphically display the events of their personal lives in chronological order along a vertical bar.”

On Sept. 30, 2011, Judge Edmond E. Chang, who presided over an emergency hearing, denied Timelines’ motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO), ruling that the plaintiff failed to show that it would suffer irreparable harm without one. About a week later, Timelines filed an amended complaint, breaking the federal trademark infringement claim into separate claims for reverse and direct infringement. Timelines also added a claim for unfair competition under both the Lanham Act and common law.

Facebook defended its use of the term “timelines” as being generic and fair use. Facebook sought a declaration of noninfringement and asked the court to cancel Timelines’ trademarks in the PTO.

Dismissed With Prejudice

After more than a year of motions, countermotions and negotiations, Facebook filed a motion for summary judgment in January 2013. Facebook said that Timelines was “seek[ing] to appropriate for its exclusive use the common English word ‘timeline(s)’ under the guise of trademark protection.” Facebook contended that not only it, but “a host of other companies use the term . . . to identify or describe aspects of products and services that consist of or relate to timelines,” which merely “refers to an arrangement of events or other information in chronological order.”

In an April 1 minute entry, Judge John W. Darrah mostly denied Facebook’s summary motion. The judge noted that the PTO had deemed Timelines’ pending trademark application as abandoned and, as such, granted in part summary judgment on the cancellation claim.

A jury trial was set for April 23.

On May 7, Timelines filed an agreed motion to dismiss the matter with prejudice, joined by Facebook. The parties did not disclose the terms of their agreement. In his order, Judge Darrah dismissed the matter with prejudice.

Timelines is represented by James T. Hultquist, Douglas A. Albritton, Michael L. DeMarino and Bruce R. Van Baren of Reed Smith in Chicago. Facebook is represented by Peter J. Willsey and Brendan J. Hughes of Cooley in Washington, D.C., Michael G. Rhodes of Cooley in San Francisco and Steven D. McCormick of Kirkland & Ellis in Chicago.

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- From LexisNexis® Mealey’s™ Daily Legal News.

The federal judge in New York overseeing the London InterBank Offered Rate (LIBOR) antitrust litigation on May 3 granted over-the-counter, bondholder and exchange-based plaintiffs two weeks to move for leave to amend their amended complaints to add allegations of antitrust injury related to their claims that 16 banks manipulated the LIBOR interest rate benchmark (In re: LIBOR-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation, No. 11 MD 2262, S.D. N.Y.).

On March 28, U.S. Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald of the Southern District of New York dismissed the antitrust claims, concluding that “[r]egardless of whether defendants’ conduct constituted a violation of the antitrust laws,” their antitrust claims failed because they did not allege that their injury resulted from any harm to competition.

In the instant memorandum, Judge Buchwald commented that “we are inclined to think that none of these allegations would change the outcome reached” in the March 28 order. Moreover, “given the obvious magnitude of this litigation,” “the comprehensive manner in which we have already addressed the issues in this case, and the tremendous amount of resources already expended by defendants, we will not require defendants to respond to any motion for leave to amend until we have had an opportunity to review such motion ourselves and have determined that a response is necessary.”

Benchmark

Each business day, the defendant banks submit to the British Banking Association (BBA) a rate that is supposed to reflect their expected costs of borrowing U.S. dollars from other banks, and the association computes and publishes the average of these submitted rates.

The published average is used as a benchmark for short-term interest rates in financial instruments worldwide.

The plaintiffs allege that the defendants conspired to report rates that did not reflect their good-faith estimates of their borrowing costs and that the defendants submitted artificial rates from August 2007 to May 2010.

The over-the-counter (OTC) plaintiffs, exchange-based plaintiffs and bondholder plaintiffs each brought a purported class action against the defendants. A fourth group of plaintiffs, known as Schwab plaintiffs, filed three lawsuits: one was filed by Charles Schwab Corp., Charles Schwab Bank N.A. and Charles Schwab & Co. Inc.; a second was filed by three Schwab bond market funds; and a third was filed by seven Schwab money funds. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ordered that the pretrial proceedings of the cases be consolidated before Judge Buchwald.

All four categories of plaintiffs alleged a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and the Schwab plaintiffs also alleged a violation of California’s antitrust statute and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. The exchange-based plaintiffs also alleged violations of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) and vicarious liability for and aiding and abetting such manipulation. State law causes of action were asserted by the OTC, exchange-based and Schwab plaintiffs.

The defendant banks are Bank of America Corp., Bank of America N.A., Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd., Citibank N.A., Citigroup Inc., Cooperatieve Bentrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank B.A., Credit Suisse Group AG, Deutsch Bank AG, HSBC Holdings plc, HSBC Bank plc, JPMorgan Chase & Co., JPMorgan Chase & Co., JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A., Lloyds Banking Group plc, HBOS plc, Norinchukin Bank, Royal Bank of Canada, Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc and WestLB AG.

No Antitrust Injury

In the March 28 order dismissing the antitrust claims, Judge Buchwald concluded that the LIBOR-setting process was not itself competitive and that the plaintiffs did not allege that the banks’ conduct had an anti-competitive effect in any market in which the defendants competed.

“Because the LIBOR-setting process was not intended to be competitive, even if we were to credit plaintiffs’ allegations that defendants subverted this cooperative process by conspiring to submit artificial estimates instead of estimates made in good faith, it would not follow that plaintiffs have suffered antitrust injury. Plaintiffs’ injury would have resulted from defendants’ misrepresentation, not from harm to competition,” the judge said.

“Plaintiffs’ allegation that the prices of LIBOR-based financial instruments ‘were affected by Defendants’ unlawful behavior,’ such that ‘Plaintiffs paid more or received less than they would have in a market free from Defendants’ collusion,’ . . . might support an allegation of price fixing but does not indicate that plaintiffs’ injury resulted from an anticompetitive aspect of defendants’ conduct,” the judge reasoned.

Similarly, there was no harm to competition in the interbank loan market, the judge found.

‘Normal Competitive Conduct’

Moreover, “the harm alleged here could have resulted from normal competitive conduct. Specifically, the injury plaintiffs suffered from defendants’ alleged conspiracy to suppress LIBOR is the same as the injury they would have suffered had each defendant decided independently to misrepresent its borrowing costs to the BBA. Even if such independent misreporting would have been fraudulent, it would not have been anticompetitive, and indeed would have been consistent with normal commercial incentives facing defendants,” the judge said.

Judge Buchwald rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that because LIBOR is a proxy for competition in the underlying market for interbank loans, the defendants harmed competition by manipulating LIBOR.

“[T]he fact remains that competition in the interbank lending market and in the market for LIBOR-based financial instruments proceeded unimpaired. If LIBOR no longer painted an accurate picture of the interbank lending market, the injury plaintiffs suffered derived from misrepresentation, not from harm to competition,” the judge said.

Because the plaintiffs did not suffer an antitrust injury, they lacked standing to bring antitrust claims, the judge ruled.

Exchange-Based Claims

Addressing the exchange-based plaintiffs’ CEA claims, Judge Buchwald rejected the defendants’ argument that the claims involved an impermissible extraterritorial application of the CEA because they rely exclusively on foreign commodities manipulation.

Instead, the judge found that “[b]y manipulating LIBOR, defendants allegedly manipulated the price of Eurodollar futures contracts, which is directly based on LIBOR. Eurodollar futures contracts, of course, are traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. . . . Because plaintiffs’ claims involve manipulation of the price of domestically traded futures contracts, they are not impermissibly extraterritorial.”

In addition, Judge Buchwald concluded that the plaintiffs adequately pleaded commodities manipulation. However, Judge Buchwald concluded that the exchange-based plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred to the extent that they rely on contracts purchased from August 2007 through May 29, 2008, the date that, based on publicly available information, the plaintiffs were on inquiry notice of their injury.

Also in the March 28 order, the judge dismissed the RICO claim as barred by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, except the Schwab plaintiffs’ California antitrust claim and the exchange-based plaintiffs’ New York common law unjust enrichment claims, which the judge dismissed with prejudice.

Counsel

The OTC plaintiffs are represented by Allan Steyer, Henry A. Cirillo and Lisa Marie Black of Steyer Lowenthal Boodrookas Alvarez & Smith in San Francisco, Michael D. Hausfeld, Steig D. Olson, Michael P. Lehmann and Jon T. King of Hausfeld in New York and Arun S. Subramanian of Susman Godfrey in New York. The exchange-based plaintiffs are represented by Daniel Hume, David E. Kovel, Roger W. Kirby and Surya Palaniappan of Kirby McInerney in New York and Samuel Howard Rudman of Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd in Melville, N.Y.

The bond plaintiffs are represented by David Haym Weinstein, Robert S. Kitchenoff, Jeremy S. Spiegel and Steven A. Asher of Weinstein Kitchenoff & Asher in Philadelphia and Karen L. Morris and Patrick F. Morris of Morris & Morris in Wilmington, Del. The Schwab plaintiffs are represented by Richard Martin Heimann, Eric B. Fastiff, Brendan Patrick Glackin and Andrew Scirica Kingsdale of Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein in San Francisco, Steven Eliott Fineman and Michael J. Miarmi of Lieff Cabraser in New York and Lowell Harry Haky of Charles Charles & Co. Inc.

Bank of America Corp. and Bank of America N.A. are represented by Robert F. Wise Jr., Arthur J. Burke and Paul S. Mishkin of Davis Polk & Wardwell in New York. Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd. is represented by Daryl A. Libow and Christopher M. Viapiano of Sullivan & Cromwell in Washington, D.C. Citibank N.A. and Citigroup Inc. are represented by Andrew A. Ruffino of Covington & Burling in New York, Alan M. Wiseman and Thomas A. Isaacson of Covington & Burling in Washington and Michael R. Lazerwitz and Joon H. Kim of Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton in New York. Cooperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank B.A. is represented by David R. Gelfand and Sean M. Murphy of Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy in New York.

Credit Suisse Group is represented by Herbert S. Washer, Elai Katz and Joel Kurtzberg of Cahill Gordon & Reindel in New York and Richard Schwed of Shearman & Sterling in New York. Deutsche Bank AG is represented by Moses Silverman and Andrew C. Finch of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison in New York. HSBC Holdings plc and HSBC Bank plc are represented by Ed DeYoung and Roger B. Cowie of Locke Lord in Dallas and Gregory T. Casamento of Locke Lord in New York. JPMorgan Chase & Co. and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., are represented by Thomas C. Rice, Juan A. Arteaga and Joan E. Flaherty of Simpson Thacher & Bartlett in New York.

Lloyds Banking Group plc and HBOS plc is represented by Marc J. Gottridge and Eric J. Stock of Hogan Lovells in New York and Richard Williamson and Megan P. Davis of Flemming Zulack Williamson Zauderer in New York. Norinchukin Bank is represented by Andrew W. Stern, Alan M. Unger and Nicholas P. Crowell of Sidley Austin in New York. Royal Bank of Canada is represented by Arthur W. Hahn and Christian T. Kemnitz of Katten Muchin Rosenman in Chicago. Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc is represented by Robert G. Houck, Alejandra de Urioste and James D. Miller of Clifford Chance in New York. WestLB AG is represented by Ethan E. Litwin and Morgan J. Stecher of Hughes Hubbard & Reed in New York.

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Practical things like the rules of court and civil procedure are often the most difficult things for law students to master because this is one area where experience is more important than memorization.  While there are some rubrics all lawyers come to know, such as the deadline for responding to a complaint, many find it easier to just look up the applicable rule when the need arises.

Unfortunately, law students sitting for the bar exam soon will not have that luxury. Starting in 2015, civil procedure will be tested on the Multistate Bar Examination (MBE), the multiple-choice section of the exam that is used in most states.

The MBE currently tests knowledge of constitutional law, contracts, criminal law and procedure, evidence, real property, and torts. These sections will be shortened to accommodate civil procedure questions. It will be the first major update in 35 years.

The National Conference of Bar Examiners made the decision to add the new legal subject after surveying educators and other members of the legal community. While most concluded that civ pro knowledge is essential for lawyers, law students may not agree.

“We know, from what students tell us, that civil procedure tends to be one of their most challenging areas of study,” Christopher Fromm, director of bar review programs, Kaplan Bar Review, stated. “Adding a section to the MBE in an area of study that students have traditionally found difficult will make the exam more challenging overall.”

For students sitting for the bar in California, Arkansas, Washington, Louisiana, and Nevada, the news may be extra difficult to swallow. The five states topped a recent ranking of the most difficult bar exams in the country. For those reading this post from New York or New Jersey, nether state made the top ten.

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- From LexisNexis® Mealey’s™ Daily Legal News.

Lead plaintiffs in a securities class action lawsuit against Fannie Mae and accounting firm KPMG LLP on May 7 asked a federal judge to approve a $ 153 million settlement that would end the lawsuit, which was brought in 2004 (In re: Fannie Mae Securities Litigation, No. 04-01639, D. D.C.).
Lead plaintiffs Ohio Republic Retirees System and State Teachers Retirement System of Ohio filed their motion for preliminary approval of the settlement in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

The lead plaintiffs originally filed the suit in 2004, naming Fannie Mae and three of its executive officers as defendants.

Claims Made 

The lead plaintiffs alleged, on behalf of all purchasers of Fannie Mae’s common stock and call options and sellers of Fannie Mae’s put options from April 17, 2001, to December 22, 2004, that the defendants issued a series of false and misleading statements concealing the fact that Fannie Mae violated Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 133 and intentionally manipulated its hedge transaction accounting to reflect misleading profits in violation of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5.

The lead plaintiffs then amended their complaint to add KPMG as a defendant, and soon after, the District Court, in three separate rulings, dismissed each of the executives for failure to plead scienter.

The lead plaintiffs are represented by W.B. Markovits, Joseph T. Deters, James R. Cummins, Melanie S. Corwin, Christopher Stock and Francis P. Karam of Waite, Schneider, Bayless & Chesley in Cincinnati, Jeffrey Lerner of Bernstein Liebhard in New York and Daniel S. Sommers of Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll in Washington.

Defendants

Fannie Mae is represented by Jeffrey Kilduff, Robert Stern and Michael Walsh Jr. of O’Melveny & Myers in Washington.

KPMG is represented by Joseph Warin, Scott Fink, John Sturc, George Brown, Andrew Tulumello and David Debold of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher in Washington.

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- From LexisNexis® Mealey’s™ Daily Legal News.

A bank and its shareholder on May 7 announced that they have filed an arbitration claim against Greece in the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in relation to Greece’s sovereign debt restructure.

Postova banka, a.s., a Slovak bank, and its shareholder Istrokapital SE said in a news release that they filed an arbitration claim with ICSID arising out of a sovereign debt restructure in March 2012 in Greece.

Debt Restructure

Postova said that it purchased the Greek government bonds in the first half of 2010. In February 2012, Postova and Istrokapital alleged that Greece passed the Greek Bondholder Act, which unilaterally amended the terms of outstanding bonds by inserting a “collective action clause.” Postova said it held Greek government bonds that were forcibly restructured by Greece, which caused Postova and Istrokapital to suffer significant losses. Postova noted that its arbitration claim appears to be the first claim filed against Greece in relation to the debt structure.

Postova and Istrokapital allege that Greece destroyed their investment by taking measures that were never taken before in debt restructuring, including the passage of legislation to retroactively and unilaterally amend the terms of bonds. Postova and Istrokapital allege that Greece has violated bilateral investment treaties with Slovakia and Cyprus.

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Crime victims are often called upon to identify the perpetrator. In fact, eyewitness testimony is used in approximately eighty thousand cases each year.

Law enforcement can use a number of different tools to identify suspects. In many cases, a witness or victim will be asked to identify the suspect from a given lineup of several individuals. When the eyewitness makes a positive identification, he or she traditionally does so verbally or in writing. But what about blinking?

In a criminal trial currently underway in Ohio, prosecutors will introduce a videotaped police interview with David Chandler, who was shot in the head and neck. Lying paralyzed in his hospital bed, Chandler was shown photographs and identified his assailant by blinking his eyes three times.

Defense attorneys routinely try to discredit the reliability of eyewitness testimony, even when provided in the best circumstances. In this case, the defense attorneys argued that police officers misinterpreted the victim’s eye movement. They also contended that the Chandler’s injuries and medication could have interfered with his ability to understand and respond to the officer’s directions.

However, the judge presiding over the trial has already ruled that the evidence is admissible, noting that Chandler made “pronounced, exaggerated” eye movements. “I find from the totality on the circumstances based on Ohio law and the facts as I found them that the identification is reliable and there is not a substantial likelihood of misidentification,” the judge ruled.

Now, it will ultimately be up to the jury to decide.

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- From LexisNexis® Mealey’s™ Daily Legal News.

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. on May 3 moved in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for dismissal of claims made by Bank of America N.A., the indenture trustee for short-term notes issued by a division of bankrupt mortgage company Taylor Bean Whitaker Mortgage Corp. (TBW), arguing that the bank’s claim to $ 1.7 billion in funds is “prudentially moot” (Bank of America National Association v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, No. 10-01681, D. D.C.).

TBW filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida in 2009. TBW’s affiliate, Ocala Funding LLC, also filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the same Bankruptcy Court on July 10, 2012 (In Re: Ocala Funding LLC, No. 12-04524, Chapter 11, M.D. Fla. Bkcy.).

Mortgage Origination

Ocala was established in 2005 by TBW to provide short-term liquidity to TBW’s mortgage origination business. Bank of America was the collateral agent, indenture trustee, depositary and custodian of the loans.

In 2010, Bank of America sued the FDIC in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in an attempt to collect $ 1.7 billion related to TBW’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which was proceeding in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida.

On Dec. 10, the District Court judge presiding over Bank of America’s action against the FDIC ruled that the bank could proceed with its lawsuit.

Specifically, the bank alleges that it is entitled to recover $ 1.7 billion from the FDIC as the receiver for the now-defunct Colonial and Platinum banks. The FDIC, in turn, has countersued. It seeks to recover $ 900 million from Bank of America for allegedly breaching its duties as the custodian and bailee for Colonial.

Assets ‘Insufficient’

In its motion filed May 3, the FDIC contends that the assets of the Colonial Bank receivership are insufficient to make any distribution on the claims of general unsecured creditors; therefore, it says, all such claims will recover nothing and have no value.

Moreover, because Bank of America’s claims against Colonial are general unsecured claims, they have no value; therefore, the claims should be dismissed because no case or controversy exists under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, the FDIC contends. Alternatively, Bank of America’s claims against the FDIC should be dismissed as “prudentially moot,” the agency adds.

Furthermore, the FDIC argues that pursuant to the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, the liability of the FDIC as a receiver is “strictly” limited to the assets of the receivership estate.

No Value

The FDIC maintains that its “No Value Determination” conclusively establishes that there are no assets in the Colonial Bank receivership estate to make any payments on general creditor claims, and consequently, those claims have no value.

TBW collapsed in August 2009, at which point the FDIC says it came to light that TBW had been manipulating the mortgage origination system. Bank of America, in filing its lawsuit for recovery of the $ 1.7 billion in question, alleges that TBW Chairman Lee Bentley Farkas and employees at Colonial and Platinum fraudulently diverted virtually all of Ocala’s assets.

Bank of America’s action seeks to recover this loss from the FDIC, but the FDIC alleges that at some point in 2008, TBW began to manipulate its operation such that thousands of loans were pledged as collateral to Ocala, Colonial and Freddie Mac at the same time.

Loss

The FDIC argues that Colonial was unaware of this “multi-pledging scheme” and ultimately lost a total of $ 900 million. The FDIC claims that Bank of America was complicit in the “multi-pledging” and seeks to recover the $ 900 million loss.

Ocala is represented by Russell M. Blain of Stichter Riedel Blain & Prosser in Tampa, Fla. TBW is represented by Kristopher E. Aungst of Berger Singerman in Miami.

The FDIC is represented by Athanasios Basdekis, Michael L. Murphy, Benjamin L. Bailey and Christopher S. Morris of Bailey & Glasser in Washington. Bank of America is represented by Mark T.G. Dworsky, Kristin L. Myles and Gregory D. Phillips of Munger Tolles & Olson in Los Angeles and Bonnie K. Arthur, Frank E. Emory Jr. and Patrick L. Robson of Hunton & Williams in Washington.

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- From LexisNexis® Mealey’s™ Daily Legal News.

A New York federal judge on April 30 granted preliminary approval of a $ 15,625,000 overtime settlement for HSBC Bank USA N.A., HSBC USA Inc. and HSBC North America Holdings Inc. (together, HSBC) personal bankers, branch relationship bankers, premier relationship managers, small business specialists and business banking specialists (Sharon Yuzary, et al. v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., et al., No. 12-3693, S.D. N.Y.; 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3693).

Billy Mui filed a class complaint against HSBC in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in February 2012, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and New York Labor Law. On May 9, 2012, Sharon Yuzary filed a class and collective action overtime lawsuit against HSBC in the same District Court.

On June 8, 2012, Daniel Hauer filed a collective action overtime suit against HSBC in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. On June 20, Yuzary filed an amended complaint and added plaintiffs Jon Racow, Henry Hu, Mina Dimetry and Teron Haughton and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 class claims under New Jersey and Connecticut law.

In June 2012, the plaintiffs in the three complaints agreed to consolidate their claims to pool their resources and preserve judicial resources. The parties then participated in mediation and ultimately reached a settlement agreement. They moved for preliminary approval of the agreement on Nov. 26.

Preliminary Approval Granted

Granting preliminary approval, Judge Paul G. Gardephe opined that “[t]he Court concludes that the proposed Settlement Agreement is within the range of possible final settlement approval, such that notice to the class is appropriate.”

Under the terms of the settlement, a common fund of $ 15,625,000 will be created to cover class members’ awards, service payments, attorney fees and costs and the settlement administrator’s fees. HSBC also agreed to pay employer payroll taxes. Two groups of HSBC employees will comprise the class. The first, “Rule 23 Classes” consists of four subclasses: a New York subclass, a California subclass, a Connecticut subclass and a New Jersey subclass. The second class, “FLSA Class Members,” consists of individuals employed in covered positions by HSBC from May 9, 2009, through Nov. 15, 2012.

The plaintiffs’ counsel may apply for attorney fees totaling up to one-third of the settlement fund. Under the terms of the settlement, they are also entitled to seek reimbursement of their litigation costs and expenses in an amount not to exceed $ 50,000.

Counsel

Amber C. Trzinski, Jennifer L. Liu and Justin M. Swartz of Outten & Golden in New York; Brian S. Schaffer, Eric J. Gitig, Frank J. Mazzaferro and Joseph A. Fitapelli of Fitapelli & Schaffer in New York; C.K. Lee of Lee Litigation Group in New York; and Gregg I. Shavitz and Susan H. Stern of Shavitz Law Group in Boca Raton, Fla., represent the plaintiffs.

Allan S. Bloom, Stephen P. Sonnenberg and Emily R. Pidot of Paul Hastings in New York represent HSBC.

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